








Traditionally focus groups have been used within marketing 
research as a method for ascertaining consumer attitudes and 
opinions. However, such an approach to research has primarily 
analyzed the product of what is said by the participants without 
considering the process and context within which the utterances are 
situated. This paper will outline an initial analysis of a pilot study 
that sets out to examine the process of the focus group using a 
Conversation Analysis approach. The analysis suggests that a 
central feature of focus groups may have something in common 
with Complex Dynamic Systems Theory. 
 
 Focus groups as a means of data collection for marketing research have a 
history dating back almost one hundred years. Yet this research has traditionally 
been interested in the unproblematic analysis of the content, following the “we ask, 
they say, now we know” approach to analysis. Recently, a body of work in the 
social sciences has shown that this approach to interviews as a method of gathering 
data for research should not be viewed as the only possible approach (Talmy 2010; 
2011). A new approach that relies more on a theoretical underpinning than an 
historical underpinning has been gaining ground in anthropology, psychology, 
sociology, and more recently Applied Linguistics. This new approach to 
interviewing in the social sciences has been described by Talmy (2011) as 
“interview as a site for analysis” in contrast with the traditional “interview as tool 
for research.” 
 It is with this in mind that I have begun research into the focus group as a 
site for research in order to investigate the language used by the participants and to 
see how this language influences the outcomes. If it can be shown that the language 
choices that are made in situ do have a profound effect on the outcomes of the focus 
group, then this finding should be considered when using focus groups in  
marketing. Furthermore, if the linguistic resources used to co-construct claims of 
knowledge should prove to have patterns then this information would be important 
for writers of SLA textbooks. This paper will detail a very preliminary analysis of a 
pilot study that was designed to inform the next stage of research.  
 
FOCUS GROUPS 
 Given the fact that focus groups are a very commonplace means of 
gathering qualitative data within the social sciences it is strange how little effort has 
been put into theorizing the implementation of the focus group beyond the basics of 
formulating questions and physically setting up and running the group. There has 
been very little research into the actual dynamics of a focus group to date.  
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Therefore, although my research ultimately sets out to break from the traditional 
content analysis approach to focus groups, the purpose of my research is to add to 
the sparse body of knowledge on the theory of focus groups and thus, it is necessary 
to use a traditional approach to setting up a focus group. There are a number of 
books that deal with setting up focus groups and, to be honest, there is very little 
difference between them. The following is a brief synthesis of the current wisdom 
on focus groups. 
 The three stages that are comprised within focus group research are, (i) 
setting up the group (recruiting, finding the location, and creating the question 
route), (ii) moderating the focus group itself, and (iii) analyzing the data. When it 
came to focus group size, the literature suggests anywhere between four and 12 
participants plus the moderator; I have chosen to have four participants and the 
moderator (myself). The recruitment strategy is one of purposeful sampling rather 
than representative sampling, i.e., recruiting participants with knowledge of the 
topic being discussed. The question route follows the traditional question route (see 
Krueger and Casey 2009) and one of the purposes of running it through a pilot study 
is to test the question route employed in the research. The second stage in focus 
group research is the moderating of the focus group, which I hope to address in the 
larger study, but not in this paper. Finally, the third stage in focus group research is 
the analysis of the data. This paper is a brief outline of what an initial analysis of the 
pilot study data has produced.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 The following is a brief outline of the background into the research 
methodology. The background in to the research is based upon a belief that is, and 
can really only be, a subjective belief on the part of the researcher. My ontological 
and epistemological belief is that the outcome of language-centered interaction 
between humans is based upon a socially constructed understanding of such 
interaction. This means that the context of a conversation will be given meaning by 
the participants as the conversation progresses and that the participants will jointly 
construct their understanding of what is being said as the conversation proceeds. 
Participants will check the meaning of any utterances they do not understand and 
they will monitor the reactions of their interlocutors and are capable of adjusting 
their utterances mid-sentence in order to produce smooth interaction. Given this 
belief in the production of spoken utterances, I have chosen to use Conversational 
Analysis (CA) as the method of data analysis as I feel this method has the best fit. 
CA is a well-established research method, and as such there is little need (or space) 
to outline its fundamentals (see Ten Have 2007). 
 The key strength of focus groups is that they are a rich source of a particular 
type of talk-in-interaction. Two elements distinguish focus group talk from what 
could be described as a ‘normal conversation’. Firstly, what makes a focus group 
different from much of the conversation analyzed in CA is that it is distinctly non-
dyadic in its form. Of course, it is the moderator who instigates the conversation 
through the use of the question route, but the interaction of a focus group is quite 
clearly not designed to be participant-moderator centered but allows, even  
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provokes, a great deal of inter-participant conversation, as well as conversation with 
the moderator. This means that one speaker can react to something that was said 
between two other participants, for example, aligning with one speaker (and 
therefore implicitly misaligning with the other speaker). This distinctly non-dyadic 
flavor makes the focus group more challenging to analyze.  
 Secondly, there is an element of institutional talk about a focus group. 
Heritage and Clayman (2010) suggest that there are elements of institutional talk 
that set it apart from ‘ordinary’ conversation. One of these elements is the fact that 
the instigation of the topic is controlled by the institution, and, in the focus group, 
the moderator represents the institution. This is not to suggest that focus group 
interaction should be included under the rubric of institutional talk, merely that it 
will have some similarities. However, one very apparent difference between focus 
group talk and institutional talk would be the fact that in institutional talk, the 
representative of the institution is often in a position of authority based on the 
asymmetry of knowledge between the interlocutors, e.g., a doctor and a patient. In a 
focus group, the asymmetry of knowledge would be inverted. The moderator, i.e., 
the representative of the institution undertaking the focus group, actually defers 
greater knowledge to the participants, and it is precisely this asymmetry that is the 
concern of the focus group, namely the moderator discerning the attitudes and 
opinions of the participants.  
 
FINDINGS 
 A pilot study focus group was undertaken in order to explore the question 
route and the viability of the topic under discussion. The topic discussed was the use 
of autonomy in the SLA classroom. A focus group was held with four teachers 
serving as participants and myself as moderator. The question route can be seen 
below.
 A question route is a plan that is designed to help the moderator, but can be 
deviated from. The first comment to make about this particular question route is that 
the first question in the transition question section did not work. The main reason 
for this failure is the fact that the question has confused two separate issues, i.e., the 
activities of the student and the activities of the teacher with the class as a whole. 
Whilst this question seemed fairly innocuous at the planning stage, during the pilot 
study focus group this question proved problematic with all participants. A question 
should address a single issue and, especially at the early stage in the focus group, be 
unambiguous so as to promote discussion. When participants are unsure of the 
thrust of a question, the likely response is silence or short answers. Therefore, it is 
critical to have clear questions in the question route. This is a very standard finding 
in focus group pilot studies and highlights the importance of doing a pilot study 
before the main study 
― 103 ―
Table 1 
Learner Autonomy Question Route 
 
Opening question 
1. Please tell me your name and where you are currently teaching. 
 
Introductory question 
1. When the phrase “Learner autonomy” is mentioned what comes to mind? 
 
Transition question 
1. Think back to a particular student (or students) whom you felt exhibited 
qualities of autonomous learning. How did you promote learner autonomy 
in this class? 
2. What are some of the challenges you face when promoting learner 
autonomy? 
3. If the learners themselves are resistant to the idea of autonomy what do you 
think the teacher should do? 
 
Key question 




1. Please jot down a brief description of the key aspects of promoting learner 
autonomy in the classroom. 
 
Summary 
1. Moderator summarizes main points discussed and then asks, “How well 
does that summarize what was said today?”  
 
Final question 




 Apart from the specific problem with the question route, two themes arose 
as reoccurring phenomena within the focus group – epistemic primacy and 
criticality. The first of these themes, epistemic primacy is easier to explain and 
analyze.  Epistemics refers to the study of the linguistic resources that are used in 
the display of knowledge. Epistemic primacy represents one of the three dimensions 
of knowledge in conversation as identified by Stivers et al (2011). Epistemic 
primacy consists of a further three subsets as seen in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 2 
Dimensions of knowledge in conversation (Stivers et al. 2011: 9). 
Dimension Description 
Epistemic access Knowing vs. not knowing 
Degree of certainty 
Knowledge source 
Directness of knowledge 
Epistemic primacy Relative rights to know 
Relative rights to claim 
Relative authority of knowledge 
Epistemic responsibility Type of knowable  
Recipient design of actions 
Recipient design of turns 
  
 
 Before exploring epistemic primacy any deeper, it is important to note that 
each component is ‘relative’, that means it is a quality dependent upon the 
knowledge and rights of all the participants in comparison with one another. 
Therefore epistemic primacy should not be seen as a quality independent of the 
participants and context but rather as being entirely constructed in situ by the 
participants, and therefore representative of the features deemed relevant by the 
participants. Relative epistemic primacy is perhaps best explained by giving an 
example. If Person A and Person B were explaining to Person C the merits of a car 
and Person A actually owned the car whereas Person B had merely read about it in a 
magazine then Person A would be deemed to have more epistemic authority. The 
right to claim is based on the belief that a speaker should be sure of their facts 
before having the right to make a knowledge claim. The right to know is based upon 
the relative closeness of participants, i.e., if Person A is closer to Person C than 
Person B is, then Person A can claim that they have a right to know more about 
Person C than Person B does. 
 In focus groups to date, participants have attended to discerning relative 
epistemic primacy amongst one another. The relative authority of the participants 
was negotiated but in a fairly non-obvious manner. There are no obvious sequences 
that follow the form of the imaginary example below: 
 
A: I have published more articles on this topic than everyone here. 
B: Well, then you know more than me on this topic. 
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  It is important to notice that this sequence is not real and yet it is precisely 
the sort of sequence one might imagine if one was imaging how epistemic authority 
was negotiated. The reason this fact is important is because, and especially from the 
perspective of producing materials for a language classroom, it would seem our 
intuition of how language is used in the pursuit of goals is mistaken.  
 The relative epistemic authority of each participant seems to have been an 
emergent property that was noticeably orientated to but not necessarily noticeably 
constructed. At some point in the focus group, the four participants looked to one of 
the participants as having more epistemic authority but not as the second pair-part 
of an adjacency pair. This process was emergent, in that there was no explicit 
incident that could be singled out. However, as the conversation was recorded it is 
possible to go back and look at some of the utterances made by the emergent leader 
that could be viewed as influential utterances.  
 
1.  
B:  Choi::ce and. autonomy are clo::sely linked= 
C: =I agree 
 
 In this example, Speaker C represents the participant who was orientated to 
as the emergent leader. Speaker B has made a claim and completed his utterance. 
Heritage (2002) shows that when a speaker makes a declarative statement about a 
topic upon which a second speaker feels they have greater epistemic primacy over 
then this second speaker will evaluate the first sentiment as accurate or not. 
Furthermore, Heritage (ibid.) says that a weak agreement such as ‘yeah’ is seen as 
an inferior epistemic position or acquiescence. In the example given above, Speaker 
B has made a declarative assertion of knowledge and Speaker C has asserted firstly, 
the right to evaluate Speaker B, and secondly, has chosen a strong agreement to 
avoid displaying acquiescence and maintain an epistemic independence from 
Speaker B. Supporting my belief that Speaker C had become the emergent leader of 
the group was the fact that after future questions by the moderator Speaker C would 
answer first. In addition, the other participants had already begun to glance at 
Speaker C before he began to speak, displaying an expectancy that he would and a 
willingness to let him do so. 
 It was at this point in the focus group that my suspicions that Speaker C was 
the emergent leader due to epistemic primacy were confirmed because Speaker C 
began to position himself as the emergent leader and this role was not challenged by 
any participants at any time. Myers (2004) suggests that one way in which 
knowledge is formed in talk-in-interaction is through statements not being 
challenged. Indeed, at this point in the analysis I began looking for evidence that 
might suggest how this position of emergent leader arose. At this point, the research 
represents merely a single case and is insufficient to make any firm proposals about 
the linguistic devices used in establishing epistemic authority. Nevertheless, given 
the fact that this is a pilot study and is designed to raise questions for further 
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research, it seems permissible to look at some of the questions that I will be 
pursuing in the main research. 
 1. Speaker C was the only participant who used expressions such as  
“the phrase used is…”, or “I believe the term for this is…”, and many other such 
expressions of a similar, possibly patronizing, kind. These expressions made 
reference to published research on the issue of learner autonomy. The question I am 
interested in exploring is: Do participants use an external source (i.e., not a 
participant in the focus group but rather published research) to produce epistemic 
authority? With only one focus group to examine, this is the only difference in 
language used between the participants, and could be said to represent a linguistic 
strategy. 
 2. This particular focus group was about student autonomy and the 
participants were teachers. Given this, do the other focus groups that are not related 
to professional or academic topics require the participants to deploy different 
strategies to establish epistemic authority? Do participants deploy different 
strategies according to how they view their relationship to the topic? As more 
research is gathered it is hoped that patterns will develop and become observable. 
 Earlier, it was mentioned that two themes arose in the focus group and the 
first theme (as just discussed) was relativity of epistemic primacy and its 
relationship with the emergent leader of the group. The second theme was the idea 
of criticality. Criticality is an idea that is taken from Complex Dynamic Systems 
Theory (CDST). De Bot (2015) looks at criticality in language (especially in code 
switching). Criticality is often described through the analogy of placing a grain of 
sand on a sand pile, and then another, and another until eventually the pile starts an 
avalanche and changes form. De Bot suggests that this sudden change in the system 
is a critical point that leads to the system reorganizing itself using only internal 
features, i.e., without an outside force necessitating change (a necessarily brief and 
therefore crude summary).  
 In the focus group, the moderator (who is also the researcher, and indeed 
the author of this paper) is responsible for deciding to move from one phase of 
questions in the question route to the next. What is it that prompts the moderator to 
move on to the next phase? This prompt would represent the point of criticality, the 
final grain of sand before the reorganization.  
 In the focus group pilot study there appeared to be two particular prompts – 
an excessive silence and a reiteration by the participants of what has already been 
said. The first of these, the excessive silence is partly due to the fact that the 
literature on focus group moderating warns of a need to be patient in finishing a 
transition point in the question route. However, it is not made explicit (and why 
would it be?) how long this silence should be permitted to last. Yet there may be a 
point that is deemed to be a sufficiently long silence so that any participant who was 
hoping to chime in would have done so and therefore such a continued silence may 
be indicative of there being no desire to uptake the opportunity to speak. Is it 
possible to ascertain what the optimal silence is? This would be important in 
teaching L2 strategies, especially in Japan. In Japan, there is a common practice on 
the part of students undertaking a word search or thinking of the correct 
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grammatical structure to have a long silence whilst doing so. It would be provable 
that a silence of a particular length is always interpreted as indicating an 
unwillingness to participate any further. The second prompt is best described as 
when the participants reach an ‘epistemic saturation point’. This is when no new 
information is being added but there is merely a rehashing of already shared 
information. 
 I am suggesting that criticality in an interview is the point where it is 
deemed necessary to move on to the next phase of the interview. The questions I am 
interested in are: 
 
1. Are there discernable patterns or categories to this criticality? 
2. Do the linguistic resources used in tipping the critical point come in discrete 
formats? 
3. Are there points in the patterns where it is possible to predict the onset of a 
critical transitional phase or is this only recognizable retrospectively?  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This has been a very brief overview of a pilot study into knowledge 
formation in focus groups. The pilot study helped to improve the question route by 
highlighting a poorly formatted question. Yet just as importantly, the pilot study 
showed that two themes appeared to have come to the fore – the relative epistemic 
authority amongst participants, and the issue of criticality in the transitioning from 
one question to another. Obviously, a single focus group is insufficient data upon 
which to form any theories but it has proven sufficient to provide questions for the 
rest of the research project. Eventually, it is hoped the research into focus groups 
will produce two outcomes. Firstly, the understanding of focus groups still remains 
fairly unsophisticated when compared to many other research tools and it is hoped 
that this will go some way to helping rectify this. Secondly, the production of 
knowledge claims in EFL/ESL textbooks may benefit from being based on actual 
data from an extensive study into the linguistic resources deployed in knowledge 
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